Joseph Butler · 5 of 26
Conspectus of the Analogy · Part I
CHAPTER I. A FUTURE LIFE.
Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see whether it is not probable that we shall live hereafter.
I. The probabilities that we shall survive death.
II. Presumptions against a future life.
REMARKS.
CHAPTER II. THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.
The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for happiness and misery.
Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.
We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.
And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the probabilities just discussed.
I. In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great extent, in our own power.
It follows, from what has been said, that
II. We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest sense.
Additional remarks on Punishment.
As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that the course of administration, as to present punishment, is analogous to what religion teaches as to the future.
Indeed they add credibility to it.
And ought to raise the most serious apprehension.
I. Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments.
II. These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws.
III. They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words.
e.g. Proverbs, ch. i.
The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as
REMARKS.
CHAPTER III. MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
As the structure of the world shows intelligence, so the mode of distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s natural government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.
But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the moral character of such government.
I. What is a moral or righteous government?
II. The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature.
REMARKS.
Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.
SUMMARY.
[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]
CHAPTER IV. OF A STATE OF PROBATION.
The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most common notion is that our future interests are depending; and depending on ourselves. And that we have opportunities for both good and bad conduct, and temptations to each.
This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.
Hence needs to be considered by itself.
Doctrine. The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on trial as to the things of this world; and so implies, what religion teaches, that his moral government puts us on trial as to a future world.
I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests.
II. These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and religious trial.
III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests.
This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,
REMARKS.
CHAPTER V. PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.
Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government.
Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for a better state.
This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed, answers an infinitely more important question,—viz.: What is our business here?
I. We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and happiness.
II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need.
III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of character.
CHAPTER VI. OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.
Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.
The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.
To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.
I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world.
II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion.
REMARKS.
Conclusion.—It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is false.
CHAPTER VII. DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
Moral government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for us to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness. A thing being true does not prove it to be good.
In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.
This we shall find to be the case.
Doctrine. On the supposition that God exercises moral government, the analogy of nature teaches that it must be a scheme, and one quite beyond our comprehension.
I. The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by analogy, that moral government is a scheme.
II. Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God, the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his moral government.
CONCLUSION.
[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]
PART II.
CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.
Every one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it
I. As a republication of natural religion.
II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason.
III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity.
REMARKS.
CONCLUSION.
This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the Scriptures.
CHAPTER II. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.
I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of Christianity.
II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world.
III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, after the course of nature was settled.
CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER III. OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GOD.
Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them.
I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world.
II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted.
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation.
IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible.
V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence.
For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.[50]
VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects.
All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.
VII. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the objections against its morality.
CHAPTER IV. CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.
In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.
But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, or credible.
It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended.
If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.
[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.]
I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension.
II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to accomplish ends.
III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature.
Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness, the next thing is to discuss objections in particular.
As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will be considered here.
CHAPTER V. OF A , AND BY HIM.
Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.
I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others.
II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he should punish.
III. In natural , God has made provision that the bad consequences of actions do not always follow.
IV. There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities.
V. In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon and safety.
VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and sacrifice.
VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office.
VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty.
CHAPTER VI. SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.
It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.
But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.
Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.
I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence.
II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal.
III. Practical reflections.
CHAPTER VII. POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.
Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evidence of its truth; i.e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.
There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.
I. Miracles.
II. As to the evidence from prophecy.
REMARK.
This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation.
THE GENERAL ARGUMENT
We now proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot be expected here; but something should be said, especially as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.
The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and final happiness.
I. Consider this revelation as a history.
II. As to the authenticity of this history.
Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he would find,
CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER VIII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.
If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these:—it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion:—it will not make men religious to[63] show them that it is as important as prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent:—the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:—no reasoning from analogy can carry full :—mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.
I. As to requiring a solution of all difficulties.
II. As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious.
III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion.
IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt.
V. As to the small influence of the analogical argument.
Further. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof; which though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot be answered.
Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,
CONCLUSION.
Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.
